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THE NATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
A triangle model, applied on the Central and Eastern European countries 
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Tartu Ülikooli, Tartu (Estonia) / Université de Genève, Geneva (Switzerland), 
bochsler@politic.unige.ch  
 
Abstract1 
 
The study of "party nationalization" is a 
young topic in the field of political party 
research. It investigates the regional 
heterogeneity of political parties. 
"Nationalization" stands for the homo-
geneity of parties’ electoral support 
across regions, or the absence of regional 
differences in the party system. This 
article shall discuss party nationalization 
in the new democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, presenting for a first time 
the degree of party nationalization in 16 
countries of the region. 
Previous studies on Western societies 
have related party nationalization to the 
degree of financial centralization: Party 
nationalization was seen as a consequence 
of centralization of government activities. 
This dominating explanation may be 
criticized because of endogeneity 
problems. Both on theoretical terms and 
empirical terms, there is evidence that 
party nationalization may be the 
                                                
1 I am grateful for help on data, councils and 
remarks to Alex Fischer, Vello Pettai, Rein 
Taagepera, the comparative politics research group 
at the University of Tartu, and two anonymous 
reviewers. This article is a revised version of my 
presentation at the CEU Graduate Conference in 
Social Sciences, “The End of Transitions”, 6 May 
2006, in Budapest. 
 
 
consequence for government 
centralization – while the existence of 
regionally distinct party system (low 
nationalization) may lead to claims for 
decentralization. 
Instead, the cleavage structure, and 
particularly ethnic cleavage, appears to 
be important for the regional structure of 
the party system. An empirical test on 
Central and Eastern European countries 
shows that indeed the ethnic structure, 
combined with electoral system 
constraints (high national thresholds) are 
the best predictor of the party 
nationalization degree. 
 
"It's the economy, stupid." James Carville, 
Clinton campaign manager, 1992. 
 
It's the ethnicity, stupid. 
Elections in Western societies are often 
won on economic issues. In the new 
European democracies however, many 
parties attract their voters with their 
position on ethnic issues.2 Elections in 
ethnically divided societies have 
frequently been described as “ethnic 
censuses”, for instance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina3. There were many attempts 
                                                
2 I define ethnicity as a fluid perception of 
collective identity of a people through a social 
group itself or through strangers. Examples in the 
article will help to substantiate this definition. 
3 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Ethnisierung der 
Politik in Bosnien-Herzegowina (Bonn: FES, 
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to apply the social cleavage approach4 to 
the Central and Eastern European party 
systems. According to the cleavage 
approach, political parties consolidated 
among cleavages that distinguish social 
groups from each other: the class, the 
rural-urban, church-state and the centre-
periphery cleavages. However, in Central 
and Eastern Europe, social cleavages in 
the Western style can hardly be seen as a 
basis for the formation of post-communist 
party systems.5 During half a century of 
                                                              
1996); International Crisis Group (ICG). Doing 
Democracy A Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report 
N°42, 9 September 1998). 
4 Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967). 
“Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Alignments. An Introduction,“ in Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967). 1-64. 
5 Scholars who translated the cleavage approach to 
Central and Eastern Europe include for instance 
Kitschelt, Herbert et al.. Post-communist Party 
Systems. Competition, Representation and Inter-
Party Cooperation. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Johannsen, Lars. “The 
foundations of state: emerging urban-rural 
cleavages in transitions countries.” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 36(3) (2003): 291-309; 
Whitefield, Stephen. “Political Cleavages and Post-
Communist Politics,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 5 (2002): 181-200; Zarycki, Tomasz. 
“Politics in the Periphery: Political Cleavages in 
Poland Interpreted in their Historical and 
International Context,” Europe-Asia Studies 52(5) 
(July 2000): 851-873. 
For the problems of the cleavage approach, see for 
instance Bielasiak, Jack. “Substance and Process in 
the Development of Party Systems in East Central 
Europe”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 
30(1) (March 1997): 23-44; Miller, Arthur H., 
Gwyn Erb, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. 
Hesli. “Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet 
Societies: Fact of Fiction?,” Journal of Politics 
62(2) (May 2000): 455-490; Elster, John, Claus 
communist rule, the differences in society 
levelled off. However, after the end of the 
communist period, with the formation of 
new independent nation-states in some of 
the regions, and with the uprising of 
parties that tried to attract voters with 
nationalistic speech, ethnicity grew to an 
important socially defined voter basis for 
political parties in many Central and 
Eastern European countries.6 
 
My article shall discuss if ethnic diversity 
leads to regional heterogeneity of the 
party system. The study of party 
nationalization7 is a young topic in the 
                                                              
Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss. Institutional Design in 
Post-Communist Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); White, Stephen, Richard 
Rose and Ian McAllister. How Russia Votes 
(Chatham: Chatham House, 1997), 64ff. For an 
overview of literature, see Tucker, Joshua A. “The 
First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and 
Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We 
Studied It?,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 
(2002): 271-304, 292f.. 
6 Cf. for instance Elster et al. Institutional Design; 
Friedman, Eben. "Electoral System Design and 
Minority Representation in Slovakia and 
Macedonia“, Ethnopolitics 4(4) (2005): 381-396. 
Information on ethnic cleavages in Central and 
Eastern European countries can be found as well in 
Trifunovska, Snežana, ed.. Minorities in Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
However, studies failed to show that ethnic 
diversity leads to fractionalization of the party 
system. Some empirical results surprisingly point 
even in the opposed direction. Moser, Robert G. 
“Ethnic Diversity, Electoral Systems, and the 
Number of Parties in Post-communist States.” 
(Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, San Francisco, 
August 30-September 2, 2001). 
7Some authors prefer the notions of "district 
heterogeneity", Morgenstern, Scott and Richard F. 
Potthoff. “The components of elections: district 
heterogeneity, district-time effects, and volatility,” 
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field of political party research. 
Previously, research treated party systems 
as a national unit. However, often they are 
regionally heterogeneous, with important 
differences in electoral support across 
regions. This is what party nationalization 
studies investigate. Recent studies have 
measured degrees of party nationalization 
in Western Europe, the Americas and 
some Asian countries.8 My article 
                                                              
Electoral Studies 24(1) (March 2005): 17-40; "party 
aggregation", Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 
The Formation of National Party Systems: 
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, 
Great Britain, India, and the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
Allik, Mirjam. “Parteisüsteemid Föderaalriikides.” 
(Master thesis, University of Tartu, 2006) or „party-
linkage across districts“, Cox, Gary W. (1997): 
Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the 
World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge). 182ff., Hicken, Allen. “Stuck in 
the Mud: Coordination and Party System 
Development in Thailand and the Philippines.” 
(Draft manuscript, forthcoming 2005)., Moenius, 
Johannes and Yuko Kasuya. “Measuring party 
linkage across districts,” Party Politics 10 (5) (Sept. 
2004): 543-564.. With the term „party 
nationalization“ I refer to Jones, Mark P. and Scott 
Mainwaring. “The Nationalization of Parties and 
Party Systems. An Empirical Measure and an 
Application to the Americas.” Party Politics 9(2) 
(March 2003): 139-166, Caramani, Daniele. The 
Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of 
National Electorates and Party Systems in Western 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) and Ishiyama, John T. “Regionalism and the 
nationalization of the legislative vote in post-
communist Russian politics.” Communist and Post-
communist Studies 35 (June 2002): 155-168. 
8 For Western Europe, see Caramani, 
Nationalization; North- and South America: 
Jones/Mainwaring, “Nationalization of Parties and 
Party Systems”. Further studies provide punctual 
data for countries in other regions. For India: 
Chhibber/Kollman, Formation; Russia: Ishiyama, 
“Regionalism and the nationalization”; Thailand 
however provides new data for the post-
communist democracies in Europe. In 
some of those countries, such as Hungary, 
parties exist nationwide and their support 
is regionally almost homogeneous 
(defined as perfect "nationalization" of the 
party system). In other cases e.g. Bosnia, 
many parties compete only regionally or 
the support varies from one region to the 
other (a low degree of party 
nationalization). 
 
Most frequently, variance in party 
nationalization has been explained 
through the degree of government 
centralization: government 
decentralization gives incentives for 
regional parties to exist, while 
concentration of power at the national 
level of government gives incentives to 
form national political organizations. 
However, researchers have not given a lot 
of attention to the objection that causality 
might go the other way round. It is both 
plausible and empirically frequent that 
regional parties wish for government 
decentralization, whereas national parties 
want to centralize the authorities. 
With this article, I shall meet two goals. 
First, I shall test the common 
centralization hypothesis for Central and 
Eastern Europe. Although it might be 
possible that such a correlation of 
                                                              
and the Philippines: Kasuya, Yuko. “Party System 
Linkage: Explaining its Variation in the Philippine 
Case.” (Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, San Francisco, August 29-September 
1, 2001.); Hicken, “Stuck in the Mud”; Australia: 
Allik, Parteisüsteemid”; Japan: Cox, Gary. 
“Electoral rules and electoral coordination”, Annual 
Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 145-61. 
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centralization and party nationalization 
exists in the region under study, it is 
possible that the causality goes the other 
way round. A test of empirical cases in the 
region shall show the relation of both 
variables and might dismiss the validity of 
the centralization hypothesis for the 
region. Instead, secondly, I shall introduce 
an alternative explanation that might 
account for differences in party 
nationalization. I shall show how the 
regional (or non-regional) structure of 
social-political cleavages, particularly 
ethnic cleavages, may explain differing 
degrees of party nationalization and show 
how some electoral system elements 
support party nationalization. Namely, 
national legal thresholds block regional 
parties and lead to a high party 
nationalization, even in the case of a 
regional cleavage structure. In order to 
carry out quantitative tests, I use my 
database with electoral results from 
Central and Eastern European countries at 
the district level (in some cases even at a 
municipal level). This allows me to 
establish the degree of nationalization of 
the parties and party systems in this 
region. Quantitative correlation analyzes 
are completed by case discussions in order 
to focus on causalities of processes. 
The first part of this article discusses the 
different concepts explaining party 
nationalization and the limits of those 
models. Then, the degrees of party 
nationalization for Central and Eastern 
European countries are calculated. This is 
followed by correlations and a regression 
model to explain party nationalization 
according to the formulated hypotheses, 
and a discussion of the problem of 
endogeneity. In the last section, I 
conclude. 
 
Drawing a “Triangle Model” of Party 
Nationalization, Decentralization and 
Ethnic Groups 
 
How can the varying degree of party 
nationalization be explained? Most of the 
existing studies state that centralization of 
government spending leads to a high 
degree of party nationalization, whereas 
decentralization or strong federalism 
brings along opportunities for regional 
parties. However which of these variables 
is the origin and which is the 
consequence? Often, regional parties 
themselves demand for government 
decentralization. If this was a general 
pattern, then centralization would be the 
consequence rather than the cause of party 
nationalization. Therefore, a second 
explanation, based on the social cleavages 
underlying the party system, appears 
promising. The focus may be on the ethnic 
structure of a country. Both 
decentralization and the ethnic diversity 
are opportunities for the creation of 
regional parties (or the non-nationalization 
of party systems). While decentralization 
and cleavages both may be a basis for 
regional diversity in the party system, a 
third aspect could possibly limit this 
phenomenon: the impact of electoral 
systems. They may introduce constraints 
against regional parties and favour 
nationalization of the party system. With 
those three approaches, a new model 
explaining party nationalization shall be 
provided. In this section, I discuss those 
three approaches based on the 
centralization of government expenses, the 
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ethnic structure of the countries, and the 
electoral systems 
 
The institutional hypothesis: Centralized 
state, centralized parties, or the other way 
round? 
 
One explanatory model discusses party 
nationalization as a consequence of the 
centralization of state expenses. In heavily 
centralized states, it is argued that parties 
are incited to design their campaign based 
on national political issues.9 From the 
voters’ perspective, in Westminster 
systems, where two parties compete for a 
parliamentary majority and the winning 
party takes on barely-restricted 
government power, “voters […] focus on 
the outcome in national legislature”.10 To 
them, it is less important who will win in 
the constituency. Instead, they want to 
know which of the two main parties will 
hold national power, and only a large 
party may do so. Consequently, if national 
politics are important, large national 
parties should be strengthened. Because 
the local or regional level of government 
is less important, voting for regional 
parties is not attractive, as they have no 
prospect of gaining regional power. In 
significantly decentralized or federalized 
states however, regional parties can have 
important positions at the provincial 
level.11 Because of those prospects, they 
may find it easier to become established 
                                                
9 Chhibberand Kollman, Formation. 
10 Cox, Making, 182ff. 
11 Blais, André; Carty, R. K.. "The psychological 
impact of electoral laws: Measuring Duverger’s 
elusive factor”, British Journal of Political Science 
21(1) (Jan. 1991): 79-93, 85. 
and they may attract voters with a 
campaign on regional issues.  
Although this argument has dominated, 
some voices do not agree with it. 
Caramani12 argues that federalist 
institutions may "reduce the expression of 
regional protest in the party system by 
opening up institutional channels of 
voice". Further, the argument seems to be 
inspired by two-party-systems, where 
indeed the main national parties form the 
government. Does it stand for larger party 
systems? Regional parties may have 
important influence on the central 
government level, providing major parties 
with the necessary votes for an absolute 
majority; interestingly enough, even in the 
Westminster systems governments often 
rely on the support of regional or ethnic 
parties (as the British Conservatives who 
were until the 1980s closely allied to the 
Ulster Unionist party). 
 
This leads me to a second criticism of the 
centralization approach: regional parties 
may be particularly interested in 
increasing the state’s decentralization. The 
non-nationalization of the party system 
thus may lead to a decentralization of 
political institutions and may lead to the 
distribution of more public finances to the 
regional level. Furthermore, regional 
parties, which help governments to gain 
majorities, may ask to be awarded in 
financial decentralization (a typical case is 
the regional parties in the recent 
government in Spain13). Hence, there is a 
                                                
12 Caramani, Nationalization, 292. 
13 Cf. Agranoff, Robert. Federal Asymmetry and 
Intergovernmental Relations in Spain. (Asymmetry 
Series. Ontario: Queens University, 2005). 
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problem of endogeneity, as the direction 
of influence may be the opposite one as 
previously believed. In many cases, a non-
nationalized party system may lead to 
more autonomy, de-centralization or even 
secession (the most extreme form of 
decentralization). 
 
The ethnic cleavage hypothesis: Party 
systems as a mirror of a country’s ethnic 
structure? 
 
What are the alternative explanations for 
different degrees of party nationalization? 
Lipset and Rokkan14 identify four major 
cleavages that structure politics and party 
competition in Western Europe. Some of 
those cleavages relate to territorial 
dimensions, particularly if we speak of the 
centre – periphery and the urban – rural 
cleavage. There are other cleavages 
discussed, particularly the economic 
cleavage of capital – labour, that do not 
have such a territorial dimension and may 
not be fixed on regional grounds. Instead, 
the cleavage exists inside (almost) each 
regional and local unit. 
 
The cleavage approach15 works quite well 
for the explanation of party systems in 
Western democracies, and one field of 
scholars finds some patterns of political 
                                                
14 Lipset/Rokkan, “Cleavage”. 
15 The notion of "political cleavage" is used in 
different ways in the literature. I employ a rather 
narrow definition of a "cleavage", describing a 
clearly defined social group, which is enduringly 
represented by its own political parties. I use 
instead the term "divisions" when speaking of 
conflict lines that either lack a clearly defined and 
stable social basis or political parties that are 
situated enduringly on those conflict line. 
cleavages in Central and Eastern European 
countries too,16 arguing that those 
divisions are related to the communist 
legacy of the countries. However, party 
politics in those countries has been shown 
to be less dominated by those cleavages.17 
Some authors investigate party positions 
regarding policy fields and defined policy 
divisions18 that are less strongly tied to 
society than Western political cleavages. 
The ethnic cleavage is an exception, as 
many parties mobilise their electorate 
around ethnic lines.19 Some authors 
address it as the centre – periphery 
cleavage20; Kitschelt et al.21 situate it as 
part of a greater cultural cleavage. We 
might see in many Central and Eastern 
European countries that voters often vote 
for parties of their ethnic group, or they 
vote according to their view about how the 
ethnic conflict should be resolved 
(radicals vs. moderates). In consequence, 
ethnicity and questions related to it may 
structure party systems. 
 
The investigation of ethnic cleavages in 
order to explain party nationalization 
degrees may lead to promising results, as 
                                                
16 Kitschelt, Herbert et al., Post-communist Party 
Systems. 
17 Cf. Elster et al., Institutional Design, 247ff.; 
Sitter, Nick. “Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party 
System Change in Europe, East and West,” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3(3) 
(2002). 425-451. 
18 For instance Miller et al., “Emerging Party 
Systems”; Marks, Gary et al. “Party Competition 
and European Integration in the East and West. 
Different Structure, Same Casuality,” Comparative 
Political Studies 39(2) (March 2006): 155-175. 
19 Elster at al., Institutional Design, 252. 
20 According to Lipset/Rokkan, "Cleavage”, 10. 
21 Kitschelt et al., Post-communist. 
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ethnic minorities in many of the Central 
and Eastern European countries are 
territorially settled. For this purpose, I 
draw on Caramani's study on Western 
European countries. Caramani describes 
the social basis for a national 
homogenization of party systems and 
voting behavior. A very important aspect 
of this national homogenization is the 
"hegemony" of the economical (left-right) 
cleavage, a cleavage that structures the 
society among social classes and holders 
of capital and employees, rather than on 
territorial characteristics. Other cleavages 
argues Caramani22, have gotten less 
important. Namely, ethno-linguistic, 
religious, centre-periphery, and urban-
rural cleavages (the main pre-industrial 
cleavages) often have a strong connotation 
with territories. But those cleavages still 
persist, with varying degrees of 
importance. They may explain differing 
degrees of party nationalization among 
West European countries. 
 
What Caramani observed for Western 
Europe seems to be even more evident for 
Central and Eastern European countries. 
On the one hand, the economic cleavage 
has much less and sometimes even no 
importance for elections.23 On the other 
hand, ethno-regional conflicts have been 
present to a great extent in the transitional 
politics of those countries. Especially 
where ethnic groups are concentrated 
geographically, the ethnic cleavage thus 
has a territorial structure and leads to a 
nationally heterogeneous voting behavior. 
                                                
22 Caramani, Nationalization, 31. 
23 Elster et al., Institutional Design; Whitefield, 
Stephen. “Political Cleavages”. 
We may thus relate low party 
nationalization to three conjunctional 
causes: 1) High ethnic fractionalization; 2) 
geographical concentration of ethnic 
minorities; and 3) a politicized ethnic 
conflict. The more those three 
characteristics apply, the less the party 
system will be nationalized. 
As discussed earlier for the case of 
government centralization, the ethnic 
cleavage approach too has its limits in 
determining causality. The actions of 
political elites may have an impact on the 
social structure and social cleavages in a 
society24 and ethnicity is not an exception 
to this influence. Caramani25 describes 
national ethnicity and nation unity as a 
"two-way process", where one part 
influences the other. In a similar way, this 
may be stated for ethnic minorities and 
regional autonomy. Post-communist 
transformation has known three different 
sets of action for changes to the ethnic 
structure of a population, or "ethnical 
engineering": (1) changing the ethnic 
awareness of the population or a part of it; 
(2) inciting or forcing mass migration 
("ethnic cleansing"); and (3) even 
genocide (cf. next section). 
 
Triangle model with interdependent 
variables 
The patterns of interdependency among 
ethnic identification, political party 
                                                
24 Cf. Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 
“Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages 
in Post-Communist Democracies,” in Elections in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The First Wave. ed. 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Ekkehard Mochmann and 
Kenneth Newton (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 
2000). 36-67. 
25 Caramani, Nationalization, 23. 
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nationalization, and centralization may 
vary from case to case, but I may suggest 
that processes – even if not so extreme, 
rapid and obvious – may be generalized in 
the following way: 
Figure 1. Mutual interdependency of the 
three main variables26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How electoral systems may work as 
constraints against regional parties 
 
Up to this point, facilitating conditions for 
the formation of regional parties – and 
thus reasons for weak party 
nationalization - have been discussed. 
However, before testing my hypotheses 
empirically for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, it is important to 
consider a restricting condition against 
regional parties as well, given some of the 
electoral systems applied in the region. 
Some electoral laws have national legal 
thresholds, allowing only parties gaining a 
minimal percentage of votes to secure 
seats in parliament. Often, those 
thresholds may be a serious obstacle to 
regional parties (as for parties of 
regionally concentrated ethnic minorities), 
as they fail to win a sufficient amount of 
votes at the national level. The region in 
which those parties compete (or the ethnic 
                                                
26 See Apppendix D for definitions. 
minority they aim to represent) may 
simply be smaller than the threshold 
needed, and thus it would be impossible to 
achieve electoral success without 
attracting non-regional voters too. It might 
be possible for a regional or ethnic 
minority party to pass the threshold, but 
only if it attracts all or at least a very large 
part of the regional or ethnic minority 
vote. This is often not realistic, as some of 
the voters prefer national parties or there 
might be several regional or ethnic 
minority parties competing with each 
other. In consequence, each of those 
regional parties (or ethnic minority 
parties) may fail. Such national legal 
thresholds often allow only national 
parties to win seats and discourage 
regional or ethnic minority parties from 
even competing. Thus, they work as a 
constraint in favour of party 
nationalization.27 
 
Hypotheses to test 
 
My model contains two variables that 
might weaken the nationalization of 
political parties and one variable that 
might promote party nationalization. 
Those variables might explain differences 
in party nationalization degrees across 
countries, my variable of interest. In the 
empirical part, I shall thus test the 
following two hypotheses explaining party 
nationalization: 
                                                
27 Cf. Bochsler, Daniel. "Les raisons pour une 
régionalisation des partis. Institutions contre les 
clivages à l’exemple des cantons suisses." (Paper 
presented at the Congrès des quatre pays, Lausanne, 
18-19 November 2005.) 
Nationalization of 
the party system
National 
identity
Centralization 
of state 
institutions
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Hypothesis A: The degree of party 
nationalization is a consequence of the 
centralization or decentralization of the 
government, with increasing centralization 
pushing for a nationalization of political 
parties. 
Hypothesis B: The degree of party 
nationalization is an expression of the 
territorial structure of ethnic identities in a 
country: Ethnic groups that live 
territorially concentrated are likely to 
decrease the degree of party 
nationalization, while in countries with 
territorially non-concentrated ethnic 
groups or in ethnic homogeneous 
countries, parties might be strongly 
nationalized. 
Hypothesis C: National legal thresholds in 
the electoral systems work as 
nationalization constraints and thus do not 
allow for low party nationalization. 
Due to the mutual influences of these 
factors (according to my triangle model), 
one has to pay attention to problems of 
endogeneity when testing these 
hypotheses. 
 
Why explaining party nationalization for 
Central and Eastern European 
countries? 
 
To test my hypotheses, I consider Central 
and Eastern European democracies as 
particularly fruitful, since many of them 
show degrees of party nationalization that 
are remarkably lower than in older 
democracies. This might be a consequence 
of the importance of ethnic cleavages and 
the absence of a clear-cut left-right 
dimension – a cleavage that in the West 
leads to a certain nationalization of 
politics. Furthermore, those countries 
show an interesting pattern regarding the 
other related variables, having varying 
degree of ethnic heterogeneity. And, while 
electoral systems with nationalization 
constraints were rare in the world before 
the 1990s, countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe introduced them in a high 
number. 
 
While party nationalization has been 
calculated for many countries, Central and 
Eastern Europe remained a blind spot for 
the study of this phenomenon. This is no 
wonder, as it required detailed regional 
electoral results, data that in some cases is 
difficult to find. This investigation is 
based on the author’s database on 
elections in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including electoral results on the regional 
or local level, for elections after 1990. 16 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
are included in the empirical analysis.28 
Before testing my hypotheses on party 
                                                
28 Russia and Ukraine have to be excluded, as it is 
not possible to establish the ethnicity of the 
independent candidates. Therefore, it is impossible 
to evaluate the ethnic structure of the party system 
(Moser investigates this question, Moser, Robert 
G.. “Ethnicity, Electoral Politics, and Minority 
Representation in Post-Communist States.” 
(International Research & Exchanges Board, 
Project Database. 
http://www.irex.org/programs/stg/research/05/mose
r.pdf, 2005)). Belarus is excluded because it lacks 
democracy. Serbia and Montenegro are included as 
single entities (similar to Horowitz, Shale and Eric 
C. Browne. “Sources of Post-Communist Party 
System Consolidation. Ideology Versus 
Institutions.” Party Politics 11(6) (2005): 689-706), 
because recently they only had direct elections to 
the sub-entity parliaments; the last direct elections 
to the Union parliament date from 1996. Kosovo 
however could not be included, as electoral results 
on the municipal level are lacking. 
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nationalization I shall explain the 
measurement of the dependent variable. 
Measuring party nationalization 
The variable that shall be discussed and 
explained in this article is the level of 
party nationalization in the region, which 
as of yet has not been calculated. The 
nationalization degree is established for 
every single party competing in elections.  
There are almost more different measures 
of party nationalization than scholars who 
have been carrying out studies in this 
field. In common, those indicators should 
measure to what degree party support 
varies across regions. All those indicators 
have to deal with the difficult task of 
providing an unbiased measure suitable 
for comparative research. Especially, the 
varying number of regional units (number 
of electoral districts, number of sub-
national regions, etc.) taken into account 
for the calculation brings along major 
problems for the measures. Known 
indicators of party nationalization are 
sensitive to the number of the regional 
units, as they provide lower values for 
more fine-grained data.29 Studies using 
such indicators risk being influenced by a 
hidden correlation between party 
nationalization and the number of units 
                                                
29 Other measures are simply unreliable, providing 
similar results for very different levels of party 
nationalization due to incomplete consideration of 
information. Chhibber/Kollman, Formation and 
Moenius/Kasuya, “Measuring”, neutralize positive 
and negative deviations from the national average 
mutually. In result, they may indicate perfect party 
nationalization even if it varies widely from region 
to region. For an overview of known indicators and 
their biases and problems, see Bochsler, Daniel: 
“The standardized ‘Gini-coefficient’ to measure 
party nationalisation.” (Working Paper. Idheap, 
Lausanne, 2005.). 
(number of electoral districts, number of 
sub-national units, etc.) or other variables 
related to it. Interpretation of such 
findings may be biased and may be result 
just from the measurement30. 
 
Our considerations are based on the Gini-
coefficient, which was originally used to 
measure inequalities in wealth 
distributions.31 Jones and Mainwarning32 
applied it to political parties, measuring 
inequalities in vote distributions across 
regions. A score of 100% represents a 
perfectly homogeneous distribution of 
votes (the party gets exactly the same 
percentage of votes in every region), 
whereas low values (close to 0%) mean 
that the votes for each party are 
concentrated in a small part of the 
territory. Using a logarithm, I correct this 
indicator, making it insensitive to the 
number of units taken into account. I call 
it “standardized party nationalization 
score” (cf. appendix A for more 
information). 
 
Party nationalization in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
My results show that party nationalization 
in some of the countries under 
investigation scores up to 0.92 points 
(Hungary) – a value close to Western 
                                                
30 For instance: Tiemann, Guido. “The 
Nationalization of East European Party Systems.” 
(Paper presented at the ECPR 3rd General 
Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September 2005,) 25: 
"Coordination across districts becomes the more 
complicated, the greater the number of districts is." 
31 Gini, Corrado. Variabilità e Mutabilità (Bologna: 
Tipografia di Paolo Cuppini, 1912). 
32 Jones/Mainwaring, Nationalization. 
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European countries with highly 
nationalized party systems - with many 
other cases are just below. At the lower 
end of the scale, one may find Macedonia 
(0.67 pt) or Bosnia with a spectacularly 
low value of approximately 0.45 points. 
For the calculation of those values, the 
most recent elections (up to the end of 
2005) to the first chamber of the national 
parliament were considered.33  
 
Testing the centralization hypothesis 
 
In order to explain the different degrees of 
party nationalization, I first test my 
centralization hypothesis (hypothesis A) 
before testing the ethnic cleavages and the 
electoral system hypotheses (hypotheses B 
and C). In addition to providing 
correlation and regression results, I shall 
discuss important cases in order to check 
for the problem of endogeneity. 
 
Party nationalization and 
decentralization: Only Bosnian values fit 
with this explanatory approach 
 
First, I shall test if the empirical data from 
this region fits with the common 
centralization hypothesis.34 Figure 2 
                                                
33 For Albania, Hungary and Lithuania – countries 
with mixed electoral systems (both proportional and 
majority/plurality systems for the elections of the 
same chamber, and each voter has two votes) – the 
nationalization degree of the proportional votes are 
listed in order to be congruent with the 
operationalization of the national threshold variable. 
However, for the countries included in the 
calculation, there is not a major difference between 
the two votes regarding the party nationalization 
degree. 
34 Decentralization may be measured either by 
institutional institutionalization or by 
shows a positive correlation of 
centralization of government expenses and 
party nationalization. Decentralized 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
have regional party systems; centralized 
countries have nationalized ones instead. 
However, the correlation tests do not give 
any information about the direction of the 
relationship. This may be investigated 
more thoroughly with case studies or more 
fine-grained quantitative and time-series 
analyzes. 
 
Figure 2. Centralization (share of 
government expenditures at the national 
level) and party nationalization. 
Sources: own database, see Appendix C. 
 
My data show that in the period around 
2005 there was a connection between 
centralization and party nationalization, 
but this connection relied only on the 
Bosnian case (if the case is excluded, the 
correlation changes its sign!). Bosnia is 
both extremely decentralized and has an 
                                                              
decentralization of government spending. For the 
first method, no data with the necessary quality 
could be found. The considerations are based on the 
most recent data found on the share of government 
expenditures on the sub-national level (see 
Appendix B). 
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almost completely non-nationalized party 
system. If analysing the sequence of how 
party nationalization and state 
decentralization in Bosnia developed, we 
can understand the relation of both 
variables better. This shall be done in the 
following paragraph. 
 
Bosnia's decentralization as a result of 
ethno-regional political parties 
 
Bosnia underwent a drastic change in de-
centralization that has never – or very 
rarely – happened in other countries. In 
1992, Bosnia did not have any significant 
administrative level between the 
municipalities and the Republic. Today’s 
constitutional order in Bosnia accords 
almost all the competencies to regional 
entities.35 This development was preceded 
by the political parties, and party leaders 
were in charge of the policies that led to 
this outcome. During the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in 1990, the Bosnian parties 
                                                
35 Many comparative studies exclude Bosnia and 
Herzegovina because of the institution of the High 
Representative and thus the lack of complete 
sovereignty of the political institutions. Mostly, 
they measure the outcome of the political 
institutions on the quality of democracy (for 
instance Beliaev, Michael. “Presidential Powers and 
Consolidation of New Postcommunist 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies 39(3) 
(April 2006): 375-398) or policy results, where the 
High Representative's veto rights indeed make a 
difference. I focus on patterns of elections and the 
party system, which are not touched by the 
institution of the High Representative, so there 
would be no reason not to include this country into 
my study. On the contrary, Bosnia increases the 
variance among all the variables included in the 
study. Nevertheless, quantitative results will be 
checked if they rely only on the influence of the 
particular Bosnian case. 
were created along ethnic lines.36 The 
most important forces were the ultra-
nationalist parties of the Bosnian Serb and 
the Bosnian Croat minority - the SDS and 
HDŽ - and the SDA party, which is 
commonly defined as almost an ethnic 
party, since it was predominantly 
supported by Bosniaks (Muslims) but 
wanted to keep a common state for all 
ethnic groups. Those parties gained an 
overwhelming majority of the votes in the 
first multiparty elections in 1990, with 
voters voting strictly according ethnic 
lines. The Bosnian Serb's SDS and 
Croatian's HDŽ demanded significant 
autonomy or secession of regions of the 
country and wanted to govern those 
regions. They reached this goal through 
the means of war (1992-95), where they 
fought with their own armed forces, in 
conjunction with foreign armies. In this 
way, both SDS and HDŽ rushed the 
change of factual power of the central 
government. A peace accord could only be 
reached through acceptance of almost 
                                                
36 Information on this subject is drawn from 
Nederlands Institut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie 
(NIOD). Srebrenica - a 'safe' area. Reconstruction, 
background, consequences and analyzes of the fall 
of a Safe Area (Amsterdam: NIOD, 2002, 
http://www.srebrenica.nl); Bianchini, Stefano. 
Sarajevo – le radici dell'odio. Identità e destino dei 
popoli balcanici. (Roma: Edizioni Associate 
Editrice Internazionale, 1996); ICG, Democracy; 
International Crisis Group (ICG). Is Dayton 
Failing? Bosnia Four Years After The Peace 
Agreement (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report N°80, 
28 October 1999); International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. 
Radislav Krstić. Case No. IT-98-33-A. Judgement 
in the Appeals Chamber (ICTY, The Hague. 
http://www.icty.org, 19 April 2004). It is not the 
goal of this paper to show how the conclusions on 
the history of Yugoslavia are drawn.  
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complete decentralization, bringing 
regional autonomy for Bosnian Serbs 
(with an own "entity") and Croats 
(through a federalization of the Muslim-
Croat entity into cantons with important 
autonomy). Despite massive pressure from 
the international community, resistance 
and sabotage by ultra-nationalist parties 
hindered the central government from 
fulfilling even minimal competence. 
Indeed, “central government institutions 
exist largely on paper”.37 Initially, even 
the defence competencies remained at the 
sub-state level. There has still not been a 
fundamental turnover towards 
centralization. In those extremely 
federalist structures, the regionalized party 
system divided along ethnic lines was 
preserved.38 
 
Ethno-regional parties thus have 
transformed the state into a heavily 
decentralized system. Therefore, 
decentralization and weak party 
nationalization are connected. However, 
the causal and temporal sequence goes 
both as the commonly supposed 
centralization hypothesis suggests and the 
other way around. The Bosnian case does 
not help to illustrate the criticism on this 
literature. Furthermore, being a rare case 
of strong decentralization in Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is important for the 
study of the causality of centralization and 
party nationalization in this region. And 
since the positive correlation of 
centralization and party nationalization 
(figure 2) relies only on Bosnia, it would 
be the only case to support the 
                                                
37 ICG, Dayton, 3. 
38 ICG, Democracy. 
centralization hypothesis. But after having 
seen that the causality goes the other way 
round, I have to dismiss the validity of the 
centralization hypothesis for Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
In the foreseeable future, developments in 
Macedonia might be a second case and 
reinforce the correlation that has been 
shown in figure 2 of centralization and 
party nationalization. As a result of an 
ethnic-territorial division of political 
forces and violent struggles, the parties 
agreed to reform the municipalities and to 
decentralize political power ("Ohrid 
agreement"). Again, the sequence of 
developments in Macedonia – if the Ohrid 
plan will be implemented – would not 
follow the centralization hypothesis, but 
be one more example of a move in the 
opposite direction: weak party 
nationalization anticipates and causes 
decentralization. 
Regionalization of the political forces and 
weakening of the central state 
Drawing on the Bosnian example, we 
might formulate a counter-hypothesis for 
the relationship. Instead of state 
centralization affecting party 
nationalization, on the contrary the shape 
of the state institutions reflects the 
territorial structure of political parties (or 
that of political organizations and 
movements in a broader sense). Nationally 
homogeneous forces will push towards a 
unified state with a high degree of 
centralization, while territorially split 
organizations will lead to demands for 
decentralization or even separatism. 
However, the latter idea is however 
related to a methodological problem. If 
weak nationalization of political parties 
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leads to separatism, then countries 
disappear or split off, and interesting cases 
– where party nationalization indeed 
affected the structure of political 
institutions – disappear from the map. 
This problem is not alien to Central and 
Eastern Europe, as both the former 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are cases 
that split off according to this pattern. The 
de-nationalization of the Yugoslav party 
system after the breakdown of the 
Communist party was one of the elements 
in the chain that lead to the dissolution of 
the Yugoslav federation. The XIV 
congress of the “League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia” (20-22 January 1990) 
marked the dissolution of the former 
monopoly party, followed by successor 
organizations at the sub-national level and 
competing ethno-regionalist movements, 
some of them with a secessionist platform. 
Regional parties in the Yugoslav sub-
national regions preceded the dissolution 
of the central government; they were even 
the basis and driving force behind this 
development on the institutional level. 
Similarly, after the fall of communism in 
Czechoslovakia, a split of the party system 
into a Czech and a Slovak part anticipated 
the split of the state.39 
 
To summarize, for the group of Central 
and Eastern European countries, the 
common hypothesis about party 
                                                
39 Cf. Elster et al., Institutional Design, 142f.; 
Olson, David M. “Dissolution of the state: Political 
parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26(3) 
1993: 301-314; Henderson, Karen. “Minorities and 
Politics in the Slovak Republic,” in Minorities in 
Europe, ed. Snežana Trifunovska (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 143-174, 148. 
nationalization being a consequence of 
government centralization finds no 
empirical confirmation. To the contrary, 
the most prominent case of Bosnia shows 
a sequence in the opposite direction. 
Generally, I suppose that there is a strong 
pressure coming from territorially split 
political organizations towards 
decentralization or separatism. 
 
Testing the ethnic cleavage and the 
electoral threshold hypotheses  
 
In my theoretical framework, I discussed 
two more hypotheses (2 and 3) that could 
explain different degrees of party 
nationalization. I connected party 
nationalization to the ethnic structure of 
the countries and to national legal 
thresholds in electoral laws. This model 
shall be tested both on grounds of the 
nationalization of party families and of the 
party systems of the countries under study. 
I distinguish ethnic minority parties  
from others – either ethnic majority 
parties or non-ethnically defined parties40 
- and furthermore, among ethnic minority 
parties, I draw distinctions according to 
the structure of the reliant ethnic group: 
The parties of ethnic groups who live 
concentrated in one region and those of 
groups who live spread throughout the 
country.41 Non-ethnically defined political 
                                                
40 A distinction of both would be very difficult in 
countries with non-intensive ethnic cleavages, not 
to say not feasible. This is why they have to be 
tested as a common category. However, the degree 
of party nationalization might be similar for both 
types of political parties. 
41 The classification is based on country-specific 
analyzes of the party systems, such as country-
specific reports and party labels. In cases where 
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parties or parties appealing to ethnic 
majority votes are quite nationalized.  
Ethnic minority parties have a 
substantially lower degree of 
nationalization than ethnically mixed or 
ethnic majority parties. Particularly, 
parties related to territorially concentrated 
ethnic minorities appear as the least 
nationalized, gathering a nationalization 
degree of as few as 0.43 points Those of 
non-concentrated minorities42 have a 
slightly higher nationalization degree 
(table 1). 
 
When comparing these values country by 
country, we see that the observed pattern 
prevails in (almost) all the 16 countries 
under study. Ethnically mixed or ethnic 
majorities parties are quite nationalized 
(0.75 to 0.92 points, only Bosnia below). 
Ethnic minority parties however are more 
regional. This is especially important 
when they represent territorially 
concentrated ethnic minorities.  Where 
parties related to non-concentrated ethnic 
minorities groups exist, they have an 
                                                              
those sources were not enough, we consulted 
further relevant party manifests, analyzed the ethnic 
structure of the parties' executive board or consulted 
specialists for the country's party system. (Those 
cases as the sources are listed in Appendix C). The 
distinction between concentrated and non-
concentrated was made using census data or 
qualitative descriptions of the ethnic minorities. 
Sources are listed in Appendix C. A more precise 
indicator was used by Lijphart, Arend: 
“Consociation and Federalism: Conceptual and 
Empirical Links.” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 12(3) (1979): 499-515, and Allik, 
“Parteisüsteemid”, but data is not available for the 
countries of my research.  
42 The most notable cases in this smaller category 
are the Russian minority oriented party in Latvia 
and the Turkish oriented party in Bulgaria. 
intermediate nationalization degree (about 
0.6-0.7 points) (cf. figure 3).43 
The figure also shows important 
differences among the countries: In 
Bosnia and in Macedonia, ethnic majority 
parties or ethnically mixed parties have 
considerably low party nationalization 
degrees. Furthermore, there is 
considerable variation of party 
nationalization degrees among ethnic 
minority parties. Overall, there is a very 
significant correlation among the 
nationalization degree of ethnic minority 
parties and the population share of the 
relative ethnic or linguistic minority 
(+0.43, 99.9% significance, cases 
weighted by the parties’ vote shares).44 
This variation may be the consequence of 
some minorities being small and others 
having a larger share of the country's 
population. When concentrated, small 
ethnic minorities live in a very small part  
                                                
43 The values for parties of non-concentrated ethnic 
minorities in the Czech Republic, in Macedonia and 
in Slovakia are not very significant, as only very 
tiny parties contribute to this result, none of them 
resembling more than 0.6% the national electorate. 
44 Where available, data on the population size of ethnic 
among citizens over 20 years old; for Latvia the 
data were calculated among citizens. The share of 
Roma population may be underestimated as census 
data on Roma communities appears to be biased. 
Milcher, Susanne and Andrey Ivanov. “The United 
Nations Development Programme's Vulnerability 
Projects: Roma and Ethnic Data” Roma Rights 
Quarterly 2/2004.Existing databases (Gurr, Ted 
Robert et al. Minorities at Risk Project. 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/, 2005); 
Alesina, Alberto et al. “Fractionalization”, Journal 
of Economic Growth 8 (2003): 155-194) of ethnic 
minorities appear not to be very useful for our 
purposes, as they are not complete for the region 
under study. Often they list only ethnic minorities 
that are in political conflict.  
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Type of party Party 
nationalizationa 
Cumulative vote share (16 
countries) 
Ethnically mixed or ethnic 
majorityb 
0,87 1490% 
Parties of non-concentrated 
minorities 
0,65 47% 
Parties of concentrated minorities 0,42 138% 
Table 1. Party types and party nationalization degree in 16 Central and Eastern 
European democracies; average value 
a Average standardized party nationalization score, weighted with the national vote share of the 
parties. b For 28 tiny parties (altogether gathering 6.3% vote share, 21 of them count each less 
than 0.2% of the national vote), the type could not be defined. They are treated as ethnically 
mixed. Sources: own database, see Appendix C. 
 
 of a country. This gives their parties a 
very local character. Larger minorities 
however live in somewhat larger regions 
and thus the nationalization degree of their 
parties is higher. The German minority in 
Poland counts only 0.4% of the country’s 
population, and most of them live in one 
single district. Consequently, both 
political parties of the Polish Germans 
have a very local character and a very low 
nationalization degree of about 0.09 
points.Albanians in Macedonia are as well 
a territorially concentrated minority, living 
in the Western parts of the country. 
Comprising 23% of Macedonia’s 
population, they are one of the largest 
ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which gives Albanian parties in 
Macedonia a higher nationalization 
degree, scoring from 0.34 up to 0.44 
points (for different parties). So far, I have 
used correlation analyzes to show some of 
the connections among variables. On this 
basis, I calculate a comprehensive model 
explaining the party nationalization degree 
by country (considering all ethnic 
minority, majority and mixed ethnic 
parties) (cf. table 2).  
Besides the ethnic structure, national 
electoral thresholds are included into the 
explanatory model. I consider them only if 
they apply for ethnic minority parties as 
well (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
cf. appendix B). In five other countries, 
there are no such thresholds (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia), they 
do not apply for ethnic minority harming 
regional parties to get represented in the 
electoral districts (Slovenia). 
 
Ethnic cleavages and political parties – 
causes and consequences 
 
There is however a problem of 
endogeneity related to the relationship of 
ethnic cleavages and party nationalization 
(as discussed before, cf. triangle model). 
As in the previous section on endogeneity 
of the centralization hypothesis, the 
Bosnian example raises questions about 
endogeneity related to the ethnic cleavage 
hypothesis. Indeed, the country appears to 
be the most significant case in post-
communist Europe that shows how 
political actors change the structure about 
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Figure 3. Party types and party nationalization by country; average values. Sources: 
own database, see Appendix C. 
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Table 2. OLS regression to explain the party nationalization degree, ethnic minority 
model. Independent variables were z-standardized. 
 B Std. Error 
Constant .845 .009 
Population share of concentrated minorities -.015 .015 
National legal threshold in the electoral law .043** .010 
Multiplicative term ethnic minorities * threshold. .064** .011 
Adjusted R2 = 0.899 / N = 16 
 
Figure 4. (cf. data points x and c) shows, how the party nationalization score is related 
to the ethnic structure of the relative country. Not surprisingly, countries with large 
territorially concentrated ethnic groups have lower party  nationalization 
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Figure 4 shows ethnic structure, national 
legal threshold and party nationalization: 
The figure shows both the calculated 
regression values (lines) and the empirical 
data points (x for countries with a low 
threshold, without national threshold or 
with exceptions for ethnic minorities, c 
for countries with a national threshold of 
4% or more). Sources: own database, see 
Appendix C. 
The dotted line (- - - -) estimates party 
nationalization for countries with national 
legal thresholds (c) (usually those 
thresholds are about 4-6% of the national 
vote). Party nationalization is rather high, 
in most of the cases above 0.85 points, 
and does not vary with a differing share of 
concentrated ethnic minorities.  
The second line (_____) estimates party 
nationalization for countries without a 
national legal threshold. As expected, in 
this group of countries (marked as X), one 
may see that party nationalization is not 
only lower, but also more influenced by 
the ethnic structure. However, results may 
be heavily influenced by the Bosnian case. 
There, all the ethnic groups are 
geographically decentralized and party 
nationalization is low, due to three parallel 
ethno-regional party systems. Besides, 
there might be other cleavages, which 
follow geographic patterns. However, the 
ethnic cleavages appear as to be important 
ones for the regional structure of the party 
systems.1  
                                                
1 Although the results presented on the ethnic 
cleavage appear conclusive, it is not plausible to 
predict party nationalization in perfectly in the 
countries under consideration, as the ethnic 
dimension is just one singular cleavage that may 
account for party nationalization. It may be one part 
of the puzzle, abut other territorial oriented 
endogeneity related to the ethnic cleavage 
hypothesis. Indeed, the country appears to 
be the most significant case in post-
communist Europe that shows how 
political actors change the structure of 
ethnic cleavages. The ethnic differences 
dominating Bosnian politics nowadays 
were already recognised during the Tito 
regime in former Yugoslavia, but kept at a 
low level. Post-Tito politics reinforced 
and changed those divisions willingly. “In 
an attempt to deflect attention away from 
their own problems or to justify claims in 
terms of other republics, the party elite in 
the various republics began to appeal 
increasingly to the ethnic Regional 
political forces in the former Yugoslavia 
and ultra-nationalist ethno-regional parties 
provoked and raised inter-ethnic conflicts 
on both grounds, and politically-supported 
campaigns incited many citizens to join a 
                                                              
cleavages co-exist. The most apparent of those is 
the urban-rural cleavage, which is reflected in some 
Central and Eastern European countries through a 
number of declared rural parties or parties that are 
strongly linked to voters either in urban or  rural 
areas. For a test of the urban-rural cleavage's impact 
on party nationalization, I correlated it – as 
measured by Whitefield (2002: 188f.) - to the party 
nationalization score. As only ten countries 
overlapped with our cases (Russia and Ukraine had 
to be excluded), the sample is very small for 
quantitative analysis, and results should be 
interpreted with caution. Surprisingly, a positive 
correlation of the importance of the urban-rural 
cleavage and party nationalization was reported, but 
it was not significant. However, a test based on the 
same data works for the ethnic cleavage, even 
almost at a 95% level of significance, despite the 
small number of cases, and even if the countries 
with most variance (Bosnia, Macedonia) were not 
part of the sample. The latter appears to be 
dominant for the explanation of differing degrees of 
party nationalization in Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
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religious community. Language policies 
introduced new linguistic differences in 
order to strengthen ethno-linguistic 
identities. Serbo-Croat, which is spoken in 
four of the six Yugoslavian Republics, 
was formerly the official language in  
 those entities. Governments under the 
control of ultra-nationalist ethno-
regionalist parties changed the official 
language of their countries. 
 
They defined dialectic forms of this 
unique language as new “national 
languages”. Language policies in the 
newly independent states were aimed at 
emphasizing language differences through 
new vocabulary and discouraging the use 
of formerly common vocabulary. Today, 
citizens of the successor states 
overwhelmingly accept those politically 
imposed linguistic borders.2 Furthermore, 
the ultra-nationalist parties, their office 
representatives, and armed forces changed 
the regional ethnic structure of the country 
by the means of ethnic cleansing and – in 
the case of East-Bosnian Srebrenica – 
through genocide.3  
 
It would thus be particularly perverted to 
explain the low party nationalization 
degree in Bosnia and Herzegovina through 
territorial ethnic lines without mentioning 
                                                
2Focussing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, this official 
language aspect is particularly interesting: The 
country today counts three official languages. 
However, two of those languages, formerly known 
as Serbo-Croat dialects, had not been spoken in 
Bosnia before the war, but rather belong to other 
former Yugoslav Republics. They may have been 
formally introduced as new official language for 
political reasons. 
3 ICTY, Krstić. 
that the ethnic lines are themselves a result 
of the implementation of ultra-nationalist 
party policies, changing languages, 
ethnicizing the society, and social division 
through genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
Political actors both reinforced the ethnic 
division and separated those groups 
territorially, forging thus a new map of 
ethnic cleavages in Bosnia. This example 
shows that questions of ethnic identity and 
party nationalization stand in a two-sided 
relationship. Ethnic lines and regional 
identities may be the result of policies of 
non-nationalized parties. On the other 
side, there are numerous examples 
showing how nationalized political parties 
promote a nationalization of identities. 
Cases according to this pattern can be 
found both in the history of Central and 
Eastern European countries and in more 
recent developments: 
 
The unification of the Slovak language, 
previously consisting of different dialects, 
was a project of the movement for the 
independence of Slovakia in the 19th 
century. A nationally united language was 
seen as a means for the creation of a 
national identity, which was the basis for 
the separatist movement.4 
In the Soviet Union, the communist party 
used centralized political institutions to 
impose the Russian language as 
countrywide standard. Even in regions 
with previously different languages, the 
                                                
4 Cf. Tomkova, Zuzana. “Inclusion and exclusion in 
language and beyond: What to make of endangered 
European dialects in the field of language 
endangerment.” (Paper presented at the 7th 
Postgraduate Conference, School of Slavonic and 
East European Studies, University College London, 
16-18 February 2006.) 
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spread of Russian should have facilitated 
communication, reduced ethnic 
differences (besides widespread 
deportation policies) and raised the 
national identity. Modification of 
languages further should help to alienate 
ethnic minorities from peoples outside the 
Soviet Union. For instance, for the 
Moldavian language, the Cyrillic alphabet 
has been imposed and new vocabulary 
introduced in order to differentiate the 
language (the Romanian dialect spoken in 
Moldova) from Romanian. 
 
After regaining national independence in 
the 1990s, two Baltic States (Latvia and 
Estonia) employed policies in order to 
reinforce the languages of the national 
majorities. The countries' citizenship laws5 
"have left large Russian minority 
populations outside the states' political 
communities".6 This has created an 
electorate that is ethnically more 
homogeneous than the whole population, 
and might be one of the reasons why 
minority parties were less successful. In 
consequence, it reduces the potential for 
an ethnically-based regionalization of the 
party system, and thus increases party 
nationalization. Although those examples 
reflect very different processes (regarding 
time period, intensity, popular support for 
those policies, respect of human rights, 
democratic legitimacy), they underline the 
pattern that nationalized political actors 
might – and sometimes do – harmonize 
                                                
5Applicants were for instance required to speak the 
language of the national majority.  
6 Chinn, Jeff and Lise A. Truex,. "The Question of 
Citizenship in the Baltics“, Journal of Democracy 
7(1) (1996): 133-147. 
the ethnic-cultural structure of a country. 
This happens either through 
homogenization of cultural values or 
languages, or through the imposition of 
some aspects of a "Leitkultur" (core 
culture) to national minorities, and the 
same process might over the long term 
even further increase party nationalization. 
Such two-sided process dependencies are 
typical for social sciences, where cases 
consist not of laboratory experiments but 
where all the variables involved might 
have direct or indirect impacts on each 
other. Nevertheless, there are arguments 
that approve the discussion of ethnic 
cleavages as explanatory factors for party 
nationalization. We might suppose that in 
democratic regimes the influence of the 
voters’ will and the voters’ identity on the 
political parties might be more immediate 
than the rather long-term formation of 
ethnic identities. For the group of 
countries investigated, this argument 
might be, as shown, at least true for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose ethnic 
composition was largely affected by civil 
war. However, even in this case the ethnic 
political players that are responsible for 
“ethnic engineering” had previously (in 
1990) been elected, and thus there is a 
reason to link party nationalization to 
ethnic boundaries. In Bosnia, as in many 
other countries of the region, nationalist 
parties in the post-communist transition 
might have reinforced ethnic awareness 
and politicized those cleavages.7 However, 
                                                
7 This problem of mutual influences is not exclusive 
to the study of party nationalization, but rather 
inherent to all studies of political cleavages that 
might be both the cause and the consequence of a 
party system. It might be fruitful to investigate how 
ethnic cleavages in the society and ethnic divisions 
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we do not have any cases of a completely 
new, artificial identity created through one 
of the political players; we deal instead 
with pre-existing ethnic boundaries, and, 
excepting Bosnia and Croatia, there was 
no large-scale ethnic cleansing in the post-
communist period happening in the 
region. The processes of homogenization 
(Baltic States) or reinforcement of ethnic 
differences (former Yugoslavia) are in 
harmony with some pre-existing identities 
or affect just some aspects of culture. The 
processes were partly supported by the 
population everywhere and were not only 
elite-imposed. Lastly, one may stress that 
the use of data on all known and 
measurable ethnic groups as an 
explanatory variable – and not only on 
politicized cleavages – reduces the 
endogeneity problem. 
 
Conclusion and outlook 
In this article, I calculated the level of 
party nationalization in Central and 
Eastern European countries and explained 
it through the ethnic structure of the 
countries under study. Most non-
ethnically defined parties (or ethnic 
majority parties) compete nationally and 
have a national electorate, whereas parties 
of territorially concentrated minorities are 
particularly weakly nationalized. The 
study showed that party nationalization in 
Central and Eastern Europe widely 
                                                              
in the party system interact with each other. Do they 
mutually reinforce each other, leading to a self-
reinforcing spiral, as it might be argued for the 
dissolution of former Yugoslavia? Or, does a non-
correspondence of ethnic cleavages and the party 
system lead to pressure on each of them to reach a 
new, stable, balanced situation? 
reflects the ethnic structure of those 
countries but electoral systems (national 
legal thresholds) may reinforce party 
nationalization. Thus, the ethnic cleavage 
and the electoral system hypotheses (B 
and C) have been approved by the 
empirical data. The results may be best 
illustrated in two countries of the region, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. 
Both those countries had significant inter-
ethnic tensions, and in both the ethnic 
cleavage is an important factor of electoral 
competition. Instead of one nationalized 
party system there are two party systems 
in Macedonia and even three regional 
party systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
following territorial ethnic boundaries. 
However, we should be aware of the 
causality problem. To some degree, ethnic 
tensions may stand at the starting point of 
a development that leads to ethno-regional 
party systems. But on the other hand, to 
some degree the regionalization of party 
systems among ethnic boundaries might 
reinforce ethnic identities and separation 
and deepen the cleavages further. 
 
Equally interesting are my negative 
findings concerning the centralization 
hypothesis (hypothesis A): There is no 
evidence that centralization of government 
expenditures in Central and Eastern 
Europe leads to an increase in party 
nationalization. Instead, the analysis of the 
Bosnian case (the only empirical case that 
contributes to the correlation of 
government centralization and party 
nationalization) shows that the ethnically-
based regionalization of the Bosnian party 
system led to a never-before-seen degree 
of state decentralization. In Macedonia, a 
similar process should take place soon, 
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while in other cases (Czechoslovakia, 
former Yugoslavia) it did lead to 
separatism and dissolution instead of 
decentralization. The question of how 
particular the strong empirical relationship 
of the ethnic structure, electoral systems, 
and party nationalization is to Central and 
Eastern Europe shall be discussed in 
future research. It would be particularly 
interesting to test the criticism and 
negative empirical findings (inverted 
dependency) regarding the centralization 
hypothesis for other groups of countries. 
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Appendix A. The calculation of the “standardized party nationalization score” 
In the research on party nationalization, many different kinds of indicators have been used to 
compare the degree of party system nationalization. They all measure the territorial homogeneity 
of electoral support for political parties. They are based on electoral outcomes across districts (or 
regions, municipalities etc. – hereafter “territorial units”). 
The most popular indicators include the standard deviation used by Caramani, the party 
nationalization score (Jones/Mainwarning), the indicator of party aggregation 
(Chhibber/Kollman) or the inflation index (Moenius/Kasuya). However, those indicators may be 
biased because of several shortcomings: 1 
■ Some of the indicators (indicator of party aggregation, inflation index) simply may take 
wrong results and under some circumstances lead to unjustified high values; 
■ others (standard deviation and transformations of this measure) are biased if not all the 
territorial units on which the indicator is calculated have the same size; 
■ they lead to low values for small parties (standard deviation); 
■ and finally, the values may diminish or rise if a large number of territorial units is taken into 
account (a common problem of party nationalization measures). 
The party nationalization score “PNS” by Jones and Mainwaring performs best of the known 
indicators, being only biased by the number of territorial units on which the calculation is carried 
out. The indicator is a simple transformation of the Gini coefficient, a measure for inequalities 
across units that is most frequently used to quantify wealth heterogeneity within a society.2 The 
Gini coefficient takes the value 0 for perfectly equal distributions (a party has exactly the same 
vote share across all territorial units) and the value 1 for perfectly unequal distributions (all the 
party’s votes are concentrated in one single point of the country). Jones and Mainwaring invert 
this scale for their “Party Nationalization Score” (PNS = 1 – Gini-coefficient). Their score is 
calculated in a first step for each single political party, and afterwards averaged for the whole 
party system. However, the larger the number of territorial units a county is divided into, the 
lower the values of the PNS score. Thus, if we have more detailed data for a country, its party 
system would seem to be more heterogeneous than if it took only larger units as a basis for the 
calculation. In consequence, the PNS can only be compared across countries with the same 
number of territorial units. This is an impractical restriction, since in some countries we have 
very fine-grained data and in others only data from half a dozen units. This is why I propose a 
standardization of the indicator by the number of territorial units, in order to transform the 
indicator into a comparable format. I use the number of 10 units as a standard for the comparison. 
I suppose (and show empirically) that the PNS indicator increases exponentially with the 
logarithm of the number of units taken into account. From this, I derive the following function 
that allows me to calculate the standardized party nationalization score (sPNS), based on the 
PNS and the number of units (unit). 
                                                
1 Caramani, Nationalization; Jones/Mainwaring, “Nationalization”; Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 
„Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States”, American Political Science 
Review 92(2) (June 1998): 329–342, 333; Moenius/Kasuya, “Measuring”; for a systematic overview, see 
Bochsler, “Gini-coefficient”. 
2 For information on the calculation of the Gini coefficient see Jones/Mainwaring, “Nationalization”, or 
Bochsler, “Gini-coefficient”. 
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sPNS = PNS (log 10 / log unit ) 
The standardized party nationalization score 
is estimating what the PNS value would be if 
we had data from exactly 10 territorial units. 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Data 
 
Decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Partial data on decentralization of institutions in some Central and European countries may be 
found in the World Bank Database on Political Institutions,1 and further in Marcou’s article.2 
Quantitative indicators for institutional decentralization are not known to the author and not all 
information on institutions is easily comparable. This is why I used data on budget 
decentralization. For EU member states, data have been taken from the World Bank Fiscal 
Decentralization Indicators.3 As some values vary considerably over time, I calculated the 
average for the last three years contained in the 1996-2000 period. For non-EU member 
countries, data for the years 2000 or 2003 was found in a Council of Europe publication4. Where 
different sources contained data on the same country, they were usually congruent. In the cases of 
Croatia and Romania, data that appeared more solid and not out-of-date were used. 
Table B1. Decentralization of government expenses 
 
Country Decentralization 
Albania 17,6% 
Bosnia 98,7% 
Bulgaria 16,8% 
Croatia 10,0% 
Czech 
Republic 
20,2% 
Estonia 21,0% 
Hungary 23,3% 
                                                
1 Beck, Thorsten et al. “New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions”, 
World Bank Economic Review 15(1) (2001): 165-176, but they are not complete and are out of date in some 
cases, as described in Horváth, Tamás M., eds. Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms. Budapest: 
Open Society Institute, 2000. 
2 Marcou Gérard: “The State of Local and Regional Democracy in South-Eastern Europe,” in Effective 
democratic governance at local and regional level, ed. The Council of Europe et al. Budapest: Open Society 
Institute / The Council of Europe, 2005. 
3 Based on the Government Finance Statistics Manual, available on 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm. 
4 Davey, Kenneth. “Fiscal Decentralization in South-East Europe,” in: Effective democratic governance at 
local and regional level, ed. The Council of Europe et al. Budapest: Open Society Institute / The Council of 
Europe, 2005, and Marcou, “Local and Regional Democracy”. 
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Latvia 23,9% 
Lithuania 20,8% 
Macedonia 7,0% 
Moldova 29,0% 
Montenegro 14,0% 
Poland 24,0% 
Romania 25,0% 
Serbia 25,0% 
Slovakia 7,9% 
Slovenia 11,2% 
Table B2. National thresholds in Central and Eastern Europe at the latest national legislative 
elections. 
Country Thres
hold 
Special 
threshold for 
ethnic 
minorities 
Remarks 
Albania 2.5% Ban on ethnic 
minority 
parties. 
Mixed electoral system, threshold applies for the 
compensatory mandates; 4% for coalitions. The legal 
ban is not implemented for all minority parties. 
Bulgaria 4% Ban on ethnic 
minority 
parties. 
The legal ban is not implemented for all minority 
parties. 
Czech 
Republic 
5% No 10% for coalitions 
Estonia 5% No Exceptions for district candidates who gain a vote share 
equivalent to one parliamentary seat. 
Hungary 5% No Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional 
mandates; 10% or 15% for coalitions. 
Latvia 5% No  
Lithuania 5% No Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional 
mandates.  
Moldova 6% No 12% for coalitions, 3% for independent candidates. 
Montenegro 3% No threshold 
for the Ulcinj 
district 
Special district without threshold in the municipality of 
Ulcinj, mainly populated by Albanians. Albanians not 
living in Ulcinj – along with other minorities (Bosnians, 
Serbs, etc.) are affected by the threshold requirement. 
Poland 5% 0% 8% for coalitions. 
Romania 5% No 8-10% for coalitions. 18 special mandates for ethnic 
minorities. 
Russia 5% No Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional 
mandates 
Serbia 5% No (After the last elections, the threshold has been removed 
for ethnic minorities.) 
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Slovakia 5% No  
Slovenia (4%) No Threshold applies only for remaining mandates, which 
are accorded on the national level. 
Two of the countries’ ethnic minorities vote in special 
non-territorial constituencies. 
Ukraine 4% No. Threshold applies for proportional mandates. 
No legal thresholds in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia. 
Source: own database. 
 
Appendix C. Elections, electoral laws and parties in the new European democracies: Sources for 
my database and remarks 
 
General sources 
Population data: Alesina, “Fractionalization”, 
and Gurr, Minorities at Risk. 
Electoral systems:  
Jovanović, Milan. Izborni sistemi 
postkomunističkih država (Beograd: Službeni 
list SCG/Fakultet političkih nauka/Institut za 
političke studije, 2004), and Shvetsova, Olga. 
“A survey of post-communist electoral 
institutions: 1990-1998,” Electoral Studies 
18(3) (Sept. 1999): 397-409. 
 
Albania 
- Center for Documentation and Information 
on Minorities in Europe – Southeast Europe 
(CEDIME-SE), Minorities In Southeast 
Europe, Roma of Albania. Author: Maria 
Koinova; 
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-
albania-roma.doc 
- Census: www.instat.gov.al (for information 
on the concentration of Greeks, Serbs and 
Macedonians). 
- Radio Free Europe, 
http://www.rferl.org/features/2001/11/071120
01082921.asp 
- European Forum for Democracy and 
Solidarity, Albania Update. 
http://www.europeanforum.net/country/albani
a. 
- Central Electoral Commission; 
http://www.cec.org.al/2004/Zgjedhejekuvendfi
les/rezultatet2005/mainKandidat.html 
- OSCE/ODIHR. Republic of Albania. 
Parliamentary Elections 3 July 2005. 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
Report. Warszaw: 2005. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- Central Electoral Commission, 
http://www.izbori.ba. 
- Alesina et al., “Fractionalization”,  and Gurr 
et al., Minorities at Risk, for population data. 
- For the ethnic affiliation of smaller political 
parties. Schmidt Hornstein, Caroline. 
„Bosnien und Herzegowina. Ein kompliziertes 
politisches Gebilde vor den Wahlen am 
5.Oktober,“ KAS-AI 8/02 (2002): 19-45. 
 
Bulgaria 
- НАЦИОНАЛЕН СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИ 
ИНСТИТУТ ; Преброяване 2001; 
НАСЕЛЕНИЕ КЪМ 01.03.2001 Г. ПО 
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Appendix D. Interdependency of the three 
main variables 
• Party nationalization ⇔ state 
centralization: A regionalization of 
political parties may create the demand for 
government decentralization, whereas 
national political parties may be inclined 
to centralize the political competencies at 
the national level. On the other hand, 
centralized political competencies may 
incite political parties to create more 
national structures, and voters to vote for 
national parties. Regionalized political 
competencies, however, may give regional 
parties the opportunity to form, gain 
substantial power, and win votes. 
• Party nationalization ⇔ regional 
“ethnic” identities: Distinct regional 
identities (regionalized ethnic diversity) 
may be the basis for regional political 
parties to win a significant basis of voters, 
while a national identity connected 
strongly to the central state may make it 
difficult for regional movements. On the 
other hand, regional political movements 
may provide a political agenda and 
program aimed at creating or stressing 
differences in regional identities. National 
political movements, however, may 
support a harmonization and creation of a 
national identity (for instance a unified 
language1), as a social basis for national 
political unity. 
State centralization ⇔ regional 
“ethnic” identities: Decentralized 
institutions help to raise the awareness of 
regional distinctiveness among citizens. 
First, citizens may identify with public 
services; second, decentralization in the 
education sector allows differing curricula 
and helps, for instance, the promotion of 
distinct regional use of language or 
distinct regional views of history. Even 
national public services provided by 
central states might be an element of 
national identity building processes. 
Centralization allows the spread of a 
national image, particularly, if it creates a 
nationwide mass media, a national 
education curriculum with a harmonized 
language, and a common view of history. 
Sometimes, states use violence or incite 
migration in order to increase ethnic 
homogeneity. On the other hand, distinct 
regional identities may be used as a 
political argument for government 
decentralization. A strong national 
identity may be used as an argument for 
the centralization of competencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 For a discussion of language policies and ethnic 
minorities, see Daftary, Farimah and François 
Grin,. Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language 
Politics in Transition Countries (Budapest: 
European Centre for Minority Issues, 2003). 
